“ A specific request to the Ministry of Defence from the Sevastopol Air Defence Command: GIVE US MISSILES FOR TURTLES [Tor/Pantsir air defense systems]! We can see the targets and technically have the capability to hit them, but we’ve got nothing to do it with!!!"

The plea, on the Telegram channel of prominent Russian "Z-blogger" and war correspondent Vladimir Romanov last month, indicates how Russian air defenses, after tackling wave after wave of Ukrainian long-range drones, are running low on ammunition.

This might just be a specific supply problem with one region. Russian leaders may want to decide to prioritize other areas; oil refineries are getting hit heavily. And, as we will see, defenses are now concentrating on the capital. But signals from multiple sources suggest the “missile drought” is widespread and getting worse.

Russia’s Massive Air Defense Arsenal

No army in the world is as lavishly supplied with mobile surface-to-air weapons as the Russians. U.S. and NATO armies generally operate under the assumption of air superiority, since Soviet times the Russians have invested heavily in mobile missile systems to protect frontline forces,

So while the U.S. has only a handful of light M-SHORAD and Avengers, the Russians have hundreds of heavy vehicles, including tracked the Tor-M , armed with eight 400-pound Mach 2.5 missiles, and the eight-wheeled Pantsir-S, with twelve shorter-range 200-pound missiles plus a pair of automatic cannon.

Such systems are designed to handle air threats from fast jets and attack helicopters to cruise missiles. The Ukrainian drones like the Fire Point F-1 and An-196 Lyutyi are not fast, agile or stealthy, and shooting them down ought to be simple – though, as Russian commentators have noted, some of their systems are embarrassingly inefficient against drones .

The problem is that a typical drone like an FP-1 costs around $60k and thousands are produced every month . The 9M330 missile fired by the Tor costs something over $600k. And while the Russians have been stockpiling these missiles for decades, even they cannot keep firing forever.

And it looks like the bottom of the magazine is in sight.

The most obvious sign of a missile shortage was that last year Russian anti-aircraft vehicles were being spotted with empty slots on their launchers rather than a full set. Closer observation showed something else: some of the reloads were not modern missiles but munitions from deep storage, including one Osa air defense system with 9M33 missiles dating back to the 70s. Other astute observers, reported by Ukrainian military news source Militarnyi , noticed Osas with the 9M33M, which is not only out of date but also only intended for naval use. A special launcher had been fitted for it to be used on a land-based platform.

As OSINT analyst Waffentraeger notes, the this is obvious on Osa because they are visible. Tor, Pantsir and other systems with enclosed launcher may also be going around with older missiles – or empty spaces.

Another highly visible sign of the missile drought was the appearance of a Russian “FrankenSAM” system . This is a truck-based launcher carrying a set of R-77 air-to-air missiles, presumably modified for use in a ground role, also picked up by Militarnyi.

Further confirmation comes from the Russian themselves. On X, Chris_O quotes Russian military correspondent Maxim Kalashnikov who interviewed air defence troops re-assigned to an infantry unit.

“ Why are they in the infantry? Simply because there just aren't enough missiles for the Buk launchers,” Kalashnikov writes. “ Often, there are just one or two missiles for every six vehicles .”

In April, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed that Russia’s shortage of air defence missiles was caused by drone strikes on production facilities . Some targets, such as the Arzamas Instrument-Making Plant which was hit last August , make crucial components such as missile gyros. If so, this looks like a death spiral, as the missile shortage will lead to more successful drone strikes and even less missiles.

Defending The Most Vital Target

Russia certainly has not run out of missiles yet. Many (presumably fully armed) air defence units have recently been redeployed to protect the capital. Dozens of Pantsir vehicles have been hoisted on to towers around Moscow to give them a clear field of fire. Russian commentators have noted how much effort the leadership puts into defending itself at the expense of forward units.

Putting surface-to-air missiles in cities is risky. Russian missiles often miss their intended low-flying target and hit residential buildings. Recent examples include this one in Novorossiysk in April and one in Krasnodar Krai in March hitting an apartment block, plus a chemical plant in Cherepovets hit by at least one Russian missile during a drone attack.

Given that Russians are banned from filming drone attacks, there may be many other such cases. The Russian military system is more likely to punish defenders for not firing than for wasting missiles uselessly during a drone attack. This of course will also contribute to the missile drought.

Whether these will be effective is another matter. On 4 th May a Ukrainian drone slipped through and hit a building about 4 miles from the Kremlin. But expect to see dwindling surface-to-air assets to be increasingly concentrated around the leader as attacks on Moscow intensify.

Russia is not alone in having a missile drought. Analysts have pointed out that during the conflict with Iran, the U.S has expended surface-to-air missiles as an unsustainable rate against volleys of ballistic missiles and, especially, cheap Iranian drones . A planned production surge is unlikely to solve the problem in the short term and may not be affordable in the longer term.

Ukraine is well ahead in this field. The country has faced the same problems as Russia over the past few years and has applied the same sort of solutions, including deploying “obsolete” HAWK missiles supplied by the U.S. and “ FrankenSAM” improvisations to utilize air-to-air missiles. Ukraine still faces a shortage of surface-to-air missiles to counter Russian ballistic missiles. But the nightly waves of Russian Shaheds are now largely downed by low-cost interceptor drones and other methods rather than by scarce missiles.

Russia is somewhat behind but has started fielding interceptor drones . Russian bloggers complain that they seem to lack Ukraine’s ability to scale up production rapidly and efficiently.

During the preparations of the May 9 th “Victory Day,” Moscow has the feel of a city under siege. There are the Pantsir defensive towers, anti-drone netting across streets, airports shut down, and cellphone blackouts to block drone navigation. Will Ukrainian drones interrupt the parade? Or will they strike other parts of the country now left undefended? The parade will come and go, but the drone threat will remain as the missile drought deepens.

And Romanov will keep on begging for more missiles in vain.