Russia just lost a Ka-52 Alligator, one its most advanced attack helicopters , while flying an anti-drone mission.

Russian sources indicate the Alligator was shot down by a local Mobile Fire Unit which was also hunting for drones. This is not the first such incident , but one of the more costly. It highlights problems with Russian air defence which has been incapable of stopping Ukraine’s increasingly intense drone attacks. At also raises questions about helicopters in the counter-drone role.

The mainstay of Ukraine’s campaign are AN-196 Lyutyi and Fire Point FP-1 strike drones, both propeller-powered and with a cruising speed of under 120 mph. They avoid Russia’s extensive surface-to-air missile force by staying low, but this makes them easy targets for other defenders.

Ukraine has shown how old transport aircraft fitted with miniguns, and attack helicopters, can easily intercept and bring down slow-moving drones. One Ukrainian Mi-24 shows at least 50 Shahed kill markings, and there are endless videos online of door gunners blasting Shaheds out of the sky. This is easy because, generally speaking, the drones make no attempt to evade but simply continue flying along a set route, though some more recent models seem to carry out automated evasive maneuvers.

The Russians have been quick to pick up this tactic. The Ka-52 Alligator has distinctive co-axial rotors so it does not need a tail rotor and can fly at over 190 mph. The main weapon for downing drones is the 30mm cannon on a fixed mounting claimed to be more accurate than the turreted version seen in the U.S. AH-64 Apache.

Further, Alligators have been seen firing new 30mm anti-drone airburst ammunition . Unlike the previous ammunition, which was designed for ground targets, this explodes when it gets close to a drone, so it does not require a direct hit. The round sprays out a cloud of shrapnel which rips through the drone’s flimsy airframe, likely igniting fuel or the warhead or causing instant structural failure. Effective range may be around a mile, far better than machine guns.

Coupled with the Alligator’s radar, which is capable of tracking aerial targets, this looks like a formidable combination. Except for the problem with friendly fire.

Mobile Fire Groups: Friend Or Foe?

Like Ukraine, Russia has deployed large numbers of local volunteers as mobile fire groups. As drone raids are detected moving across the country, mobile fire groups are sent to likely target locations. They may be armed with machine guns—sometimes 1908 Maxim guns or other antiques--or with more modern weapons.

Ukrainian mobile fire groups are highly effective, and until the introduction of interceptors were one of the effective means of downing drones, with one unit claiming over a hundred Shaheds in one night.

In this case the unit from BARS (Russia’s Combat Army Reserve) was armed with a 9K333 Verba (“Willow”) man-potable air defence system. which turned out to be unfortunate for the helicopter crew. Verba is one of many Russian shoulder-launched missiles in the same role as the U.S. Stinger.

The Verba is an advanced supersonic missile with a triple seeker head which tracks int he ultraviolet, near infrared, and mid-infrared, making it far more resistant to decoys and other distractions than previous designs. It had a range of over three miles and carries a three-pound warhead.

The Russian mobile fire groups have a reputation for being lazy, drunk and incompetent. This may be related to the fact that pay is so bad: reportedly as little as $133 a week , with a $200 bonus for each drone shot down, and frequent complaints about bonuses not being paid.

So it is understandable why such groups might be eager to shoot first without verifying the target. The helicopters defensive aids and armor evidently did not protect it.

Both of the Alligators two crew members ejected. Ejection seats are not fitted on Western helicopters because of the challenges of ejecting from under spinning rotor blades, and the perception that a controlled landing is safer. In this case one crew member reportedly died instantly due to an ejection failure , the other survived and was safely recovered.

The cost to Russia was one helicopter crew member, one $170,000 missile, and one $16m Ka-52 Alligator, plus failing to stop a drone which make have done more expensive damage.

The Deconfliction Problem

This is a classic problem of deconflicting airspace, ensuring that friendly forces do not get in each other’s way. For Russia, the situation is made more complicated by commercial air traffic still operating in the same airspace as attacking drones. In March, Russian aviation blogger Pavel Koshkin was killed along with a passenger when air defenses near Moscow targeted his ultralight aircraft .

Russian air defenses have reportedly shot down at least seven of their own helicopters in the current conflict, in several cases while these were pursuing drones . As the intensity of drone attacks rises and more helicopters attempt intercepts, this number will likely rise.

Helicopters are an efficient way to tackle the drone threat, But they need to be tightly coordinated with ground forces, so that everyone knows there are friendly aircraft in the area and a protocol is established to ensure that targets are correctly identified.

This is no small challenge, and one that Ukraine faces as well. On 30 th June Ukraine reportedly lost an Mi-8 helicopter on an anti-drone mission.

Meanwhile the attack drones are evolving. Ukraine has recently fielded some armed with unguided rockets as well as a warhead . The drones have engaged Russian mobile fire units on the ground, and if the operator saw a helicopter that would be a high-value target. A few Russian Shaheds have even been seen toting air-to-air guided missiles though there is no record of these having been fired and the high cost of such missiles means they are not likely to be fielded in numbers.

The dangers of hunting drones with helicopters are clear. The question is at what point the mission stops being worthwhile: if a helicopter shoots down 50 drones and is then lost, it would be a definite win for the enemy.

Russia had around 90 Ka-52 at the start of the conflict but the only about half that many may still be operational. Will Russia keep using (and losing) them to stem the rising tide of drone attacks, or try to preserve the fleet? Will co-ordination with units on the ground get better or deteriorate, and will pilots risk flying in areas occupied by trigger-happy mobile fire units?

All we know for sure is that the drone war is set to continue.