Over the past month, both Russia and Ukraine have expanded their use of tactical glide bombs, reflecting a broader shift in how each side plans to deliver firepower. This change has been driven by the pervasive use of drones, which has limited the employment of artillery, the traditional means of delivering massed fires. Since both countries rely on massed fires as a central part of their operational doctrine, the growing limitations of artillery have made glide bombs an attractive alternative. As this trend continues, glide bombs are poised to assume a growing role on both sides, shaping the next phase of the war.

Glide Bombs As A Replacement For Artillery

Russia and Ukraine both follow a fire-centric doctrine in which artillery and other indirect fires have historically been the primary means of destroying enemy forces. Infantry often plays a more supporting role, securing areas after they have been cleared by a heavy barrage, allowing the artillery units to move forward. While this doctrine has not fundamentally changed during the war, both sides are increasingly being forced to shift away from relying on artillery to deliver fires.

According to the Military Balance , Russia and Ukraine started the war with 2,433 and 1,176 howitzers, respectively. Oryx has visually confirmed 1,716 destroyed Russian artillery pieces and 1,011 Ukrainian pieces. Although both militaries have procured a large number of artillery pieces through foreign aid, domestic development, and refurbishing older systems, these losses are very significant. Additionally, the Oryx numbers represent the lower limit, with actual losses being much higher. These tremendous losses are due to the heavy use of drones that patrol the battlefield searching for enemy howitzers, which are quickly identified whenever they fire. The drones also search for and target the artillery resupply vehicles, starving the howitzers of the ammunition they need to fire.

As a result, both sides have pulled their artillery systems farther from the front . While some of the longer-range systems can still reach targets from these rear positions, many other artillery systems can no longer be employed effectively. To deliver fires, both Russia and Ukraine have increasingly relied on mortars and drones. However, both carry much smaller munitions than conventional artillery. Even when used in coordinated attacks, they generally lack the destructive power of a sustained artillery barrage. Additionally, drones are vulnerable to weather, electronic warfare, and ground-based air defenses. Even larger loitering munitions, such as Russia's Geran and Ukraine's Liutyi, carry relatively modest warheads. Their slow speeds and long flight times also make them more susceptible to electronic warfare and air defenses.

Given these challenges, Russia and Ukraine need an alternative that can deliver heavy firepower in large quantities. Russia has already begun filling this gap with glide bombs, and Ukraine is now following suit. A glide bomb is a conventional bomb fitted with wings and a guidance kit. After release from an aircraft, the wings deploy and the bomb glides tens of miles to its target using satellite navigation and inertial guidance. Upon release, the bomb is traveling at the speed of the aircraft, making it a fast-moving target that is difficult for ground-based air defenses to intercept. This allows aircraft to strike targets while remaining outside much of the enemy’s air defense envelope. Glide bombs typically weigh hundreds of kilograms, giving them far greater destructive power than drones or mortars and allowing them to deliver effects comparable to concentrated artillery fires.

Russia has spent the past two years converting its large inventory of Soviet-era bombs into precision glide weapons. Its most common glide bomb models are the FAB-250, FAB-500, FAB-1500, and FAB-3000, where the number corresponds to the nominal weight of the bomb in kilograms. Each bomb is fitted with the Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK), which adds folding wings, control surfaces, an inertial measurement unit, and satellite guidance. The kit allows the bomb to glide 60 to 80 kilometers following the release from aircraft such as the Su-34, Su-35, and Su-30.

Russia has continuously upgraded these weapons in response to Ukrainian countermeasures. Early UMPK kits were disrupted by Ukrainian electronic warfare that jammed the satellite navigation signals. Russia responded by outfitting the glide bombs with Kometa satellite navigation modules that are more resistant to jamming. The newest variants also rely more heavily on inertial navigation when satellite signals are degraded. The UMPK kits have been additionally upgraded to increase the range of the glide bomb, with newer versions reaching up to 95 km, further keeping the aircraft outside of Ukraine’s air defense envelope.

Russia has significantly increased its use of glide bombs over the past month, reportedly launching more than 1,800 glide bombs during the first week of June . This shift is further evident in the Russian Ministry of Defense’s messaging. In previous months, the ministry posted daily videos on its Telegram channel of artillery strikes from across the front. However, during June, it began featuring at least one glide bomb strike each day. While some of these strikes support Russia’s strategic campaign, most appear to support tactical operations. During the last week of June, the ministry posted videos showing glide bombs destroying temporary deployment areas of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, and Donetsk regions. It also reported strikes against UAV command posts in the Kharkiv and Dnepropetrovsk regions, as well as logistics bridges in the Sumy region and near Krasny Liman. In each case, the glide bombs are used for a precision strike against Ukrainian targets that require substantial firepower in directly support of Russian tactical maneuvers.

Ukraine does not have the large inventory of aerial bombs that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, making its ability to field glide bombs much more limited. Regardless, Ukraine has acquired a limited number of glide bombs through foreign military assistance . These include the American GBU-62 JDAM-ER, which has been used in limited strikes against key Russian targets, including a strike on a Russian base on May 31. Ukrainian forces also operate the French AASM Hammer and the American Rusty Dagger, both of which combine glide capabilities with rocket propulsion to extend their range and versatility. Although these systems support tactical operations, their extended range allows them to participate in Ukraine’s broader strategic strike campaign. Because these weapons are supplied by foreign partners, Ukraine has only limited quantities and must use them judiciously.

However, Ukraine's situation has recently changed with the introduction of a domestically produced glide bomb developed through the Brave1 initiative. The Vyrivniuvach ("Equalizer") , developed by DG Industry, was unveiled in May 2026 after 17 months of development. The glide bomb weighs 250 kilograms, putting it on par with the Russian FAB-250. It uses a Ukrainian-designed wing and guidance system. Ukraine is also working to produce the bomb bodies domestically, since it does not have a large stockpile of Soviet-era aerial bombs.

The Vyrivniuvach has reportedly already been used in combat, with videos posted on social media showing a successful strike against a Russian position on June 23, 2026. While its use has been limited to date, Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to rapidly develop and field new technologies. As production increases, Ukraine can be expected to employ glide bombs more extensively, particularly as it seeks to counter the Russian summer offensive.

The Trajectory And Impact Of Glide Bombs

As the use of glide bombs increases, both Russia and Ukraine will continue investing in glide bomb technology, as well as defenses against these weapons. Future glide bombs will likely incorporate more advanced sensors derived from drone technology to improve precision and operate more effectively in contested environments. They may also incorporate rocket propulsion or small jet engines to extend their range. At the same time, electronic warfare systems will continue to improve their ability to jam or spoof navigation signals.

The importance of glide bombs will continue to grow as the war evolves. Russia’s summer offensive and the associated Ukrainian counteroffensives continue to require heavy fires to destroy enemy forces and create the conditions for ground maneuver. Meanwhile, advances in drone technology will further limit the use of artillery, and neither side can afford to lose its ability to deliver massed fires. Glide bombs will fill that role, providing the heavy firepower needed to sustain offensive and defensive operations. As their use expands, glide bombs can be expected to define the next phase of the war.